God, experience and «interiority» in Edith Stein's phenomenology: is it legitimate to believe in a real divine presence as object of religious experience if it is equally legitimate to doubt the divine nature of such object?

Abstract

By describing religious experience, Edith Stein reveals not only her analysis of this specific experience, but also the meaning of her own phenomenology. Accepting the suggestion of her friend Roman Ingarden to establish a parallel between the treatment given to the «reality» of the «world» and the treatment given to the «object» of religious experience, Edith Stein makes it clear that, if it is rationally legitimate to believe in a divine being as object of experience, it is also methodically legitimate to doubt the divine nature of any object of experience. By its supernatural essence, the Transcendent Reality, God, ensures that the experience of him does not need proof, a fact that would serve as a basis for the parallel with the affirmation of the «reality» or «objectivity» of the «world». However, this problem cannot be treated in the terms of the so-called «debate idealism versus realism»; and, specifically regarding the description of religious experience, it will only be authentic if it treats its object or substance as an attribute of an experience.